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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
balance the equities of matters before it, has enforced the
evidentiary bar or found exceptions, depending on, cir-
cumstances of the particular case." The report further
points out that "the volume of cases in which the rule has
been before the Court of Appeals demonstrates either the
difficulty of its application or the harshness of its result
from which many appellants have hoped to obtain relief
by appeal." It would seem to follow from these comments
that a statute which continues to mystify able courts and
good lawyers in its endless complexities of interpretation
and application should be revised or abolished.
Herbert J. Belgrad
FORESEEABLE INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE
NOT A 'SUPERSEDING CAUSE
Jubb v. Ford.'
Appellant's carry-all, with the words "School Bus"
painted on its rear, was used to transport seven mentally-
retarded children to and from school. However, this
"school bus" was not equipped with flashing stop signals
required of school buses by statute,2 and its capacity was
too small to afford it the school bus privilege of stopping
on the travelled portion of the highway.' One rainy day
the carry-all stopped in the slow lane of Ritchie Highway
to discharge the plaintiff into the care of her awaiting
father. A Cadillac approached the "bus" from the rear and
began to pass. When the driver noted the words "School
Bus," he applied his brakes, hoping to stop the statutory
1221 Md. 507, 157 A. 2d 422 (1960).
2 6 MD. CoDm (1957) Art. 66 , § 257.
8 Id., § 255. The school bus stands in a preferred position on the
American highway. The duty to stop behind a school bus is as "inflexible
. ..as that of obeying the boulevard law and ... a school bus driver has
the right to assume that [the duty] will be obeyed implicitly by cars
approaching from the front and rear." Chackness v. Board of Education,
209 Md. 88, 95-96, 120 A. 2d 392 (1956). Motorists have the concomitant
duty of watchfulness and attentiveness. Richards v. Miller North Broad
Transit Co., 96 N.H. 272, 74 A. 2d 552 (1950); Hughes v. Thayer, 229
N.C. 773, 51 S.E. 2d 488 (1949); Wheaton v. Conkle, 57 Ohio App. 373,
14 N.E. 2d 363 (1937). The motorist's duty is not diminished even if the
school bus stops negligently on the road in violation of statute, and the
motorist's negligence may be the proximate cause of the injury to a child
alighting from such school bus. Allyn & Bacon Book Publishers v.
Nicholson, 58 Ga. App. 729, 199 S.E. 771 (1938). Where the school bus
has electric signal devices in working order as required by statute, the oper-
ator need not give hand signals as required of other users of the highway.
Webb v. Smith, 176 Va. 235, 10 S.E. 2d 503, 131 A.L.R. 558 (1940). For
a comprehensive discussion, see 30 A.L.R. 2d, 105 (1953).
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distance behind the "bus."'4 As a normal stop was being
made, the Cadillac was struck from the rear by a tractor-
trailer which jack-knifed when its brakes were applied.
The impact threw the Cadillac against the carry-all, which,
as a result, struck the plaintiff, who sued the owners of the
carry-all, the Cadillac, and the tractor-trailer. The jury
returned a verdict against the carry-all and the tractor-
trailer, and the former appealed.
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals remanded
the case for a new trial because of an improper instruction,
the Court nevertheless commented on the facts of the
case. The Court saw the carry-all as negligent in stopping
where it should not stop, because it was not a school bus
within the statutory definition. This negligence was com-
pounded by the imitation of a school bus, in color and
lettering, but not in signalling devices. This partial imita-
tion foreseeably could and did confuse motorists as to the
nature of the carry-all.5 This view of the case caused the
Court to reject the carry-all's contention that the negli-
gence of the tractor-trailer was a superseding cause to
relieve the carry-all of liability.'
Legal writers7 and the courts agree that intervening
negligence which is not extraordinary' or unusual,9 but
'Drivers approaching or overtaking a school bus stopped 'on the high-
way for the purpose of receiving or discharging children are required to
"come to a full stop at least ten (10) feet from such school bus." 6 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 66%, § 259. By the Cadillac driver's own admission,
he would have been unable to come to a complete stop more than four
feet to the rear of the carry-all. Supra, n. 1, 510,
5 A carry-all is not the usual type of school bus a motorist expects to
encounter on the highway. Therefore, a motorist would not at first glance
readily recognize that the carry-all was a school bus. The Cadillac driver
did not realize the true nature of the carry-all until he had begun his
passing movement. Supra, n. 1, 510. The driver of the tractor-trailer
could not be found to testify at the triaL By agreement, his traffic court
statement was admitted into evidence. He stated that he thought the
carry-all was a State Roads vehicle and prepared to follow the Cadillac
in passing it. The driver of the trailer claimed he did not notice, due to
the lack of flashing stop signals, that the carry-all was a school bus until
the tractor-trailer was "already sliding." Supra, n. 1, 511.
' "Our view is that if a jury determined [the owner of the carry-all] to
have been negligent, his acts and omissions induced the negligent acts and
omissions of the [driver of the tractor-trailer] and the two would have
concurred in causing the injury." Supra, n. 1, 513.
72 RESTATEMENT, TouRTs (1934) §§ 433, 439, 447; PzossEu, ToRTs (2d
ed. 1955) § 49. "The view that one need not foresee the misconduct of
another, . . . has long since given place to the modern conception that
anything which is, in fact, likely to occur, is legally foreseeable."
Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others As Basis For Tort Liability,
56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 316, 330-331, n. 79 (1908).
8Roadman v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 108 A. 2d 754, 759 (1954) ; 2 RESTATE-
MENT, ToTs (1934) §§ 433, 447.
' Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co., 171 Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 1, 3 (1898);
Kelson v. Public Service R. Co., 94 N.J.L. 527, 110 A. 919 (1920).
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is instead a foreseeable 10 consequence which could rea-
sonably have been anticipated" as likely to follow one's
negligence, will not serve as a superseding cause to relieve
the initially negligent actor of liability. When the fore-
seeable negligent act combines with the prior negligence,
the acts become concurrent causes of the injury 2 and the
actors are held jointly and severally liable to the injured
party.
13
There is difficulty in the application of this well-settled
rule 4 because the concept of foreseeability is inextricably
bound to the factual situation presented. Negligence and
causation, unlike the answers to algebraic problems, can-
not be determined simply by reliance on a scientific, or
ritualistic, process or formula. 5 The broadly-phrased rules
are only a starting point. The courts must look to the
jury 6 for the solutions, reached by common sense" ap-
plied to the facts of the case.
At first glance the principal case may seem to stretch
the doctrine of foreseeability to its breaking point. How-
ever, the case is not out of line with previous judicial pro-
nouncements in similar intervening negligence cases. 8
0 McVey v. Gerrald, 172 Md. 595, 602, 192 A. 789 (1937) ; Marquardt v.
Orlowski, 18 Il. App. 2d 135, 151 N.E. 2d 109, 114 (1958) ; Rowell v.
City of Witchita, 162 Kan. 294, 176 P. 2d 590, 596-597 (1947); Cwik v.
Zylstra, 58 N.J. Super. 29, 155 A. 2d 277, 280-281 (1959); Genovay v.
Fox, 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A. 2d 229, 235, 236 (1958).
1 Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149, 162, 200 A. 353 (1938) ; Penn. Steel Co.
v. Wilkinson, 107 Md. 574, 581, 69 A. 412 (1908) ; Washington v. Kemp,
7 Ga. App. 235, 102 S.M. 2d 910, 913 (1958); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v.
Mills, 78 ,G. App. 690, 51 S.E. 2d 705 (1949).
" Penn. Steel Co. v. Wilkinson, supra, n. 11.
Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P. 2d 1053, 1062 (1958).
' Garbis v. Apatoff, 192 Md. 12, 16-17, 63 A. 2d 307 (1949).
PRosSER, op. cit. supra, n. 7, 257:
"'Proximate cause' cannot be reduced to absolute rules. No better
statement ever has been made concerning the problem than that of
Street [Foundations of Legal Liability, 1906, 110]: 'It is always to
be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent. . . .'
Campbell v. State, 203 Md. 338, 346, 100 A. 2d 798 (1953).
1Urging a dissecting glance at the facts is the Maryland Court of
Appeals statement that it Would "not indulge in subtleties and refine-
ments as to causation that might defeat the ends of justice." Mullan v.
Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 269, 49 A. 2d 040 (1946).
18 Lombardi v. Wallad, 98 Conn. 510, 120 A. 291, 294 (1923), used strik-
ingly similar language to two Maryland cases, infra, ns. 19, 20, to find
liable one who had reduced to burning embers a fire he had been using
in a place frequented by children, and who then left the spot unguarded
to get water to extinguish the embers only to have his absence result in
an eight year old boy igniting a stick in the embers, and touching It to
the plaintiff child's dress, thus causing the compensated injuries.
A driver who lost control of his car when his arm was seized by a
playful inebriated passenger could not claim the seizure was a super-
seding cause to relieve himself of liability for the damage caused by the
uncontrqolled car. Bessette v. Humiston, 121 Vt. 325, 157 A. 2d 468 (1960).
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The principal case and related cases in whiich the con-
tention is formulated that the intervening negligence
serves as a superseding cause involve situations where the
negligence of the first actor will only result in injury to
the plaintiff if a second actor is also negligent. Two Mary-
land cases 19 spoke with direct reference to such a situa-
tion. They concluded that
". . the liability of the person, first in fault will
depend upon the question whether the negligent act
of the other was one which a man of ordinary ex-
perience and sagacity, acquainted with all the cir-
cumstances, could reasonably anticipate or not. If
[the original negligent actor] could have anticipated
that the intervening act of negligence might, in a
natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act
of negligence, the person first in fault is not released
from liability by reason of the intervening negligence
of another. ' 20
In essence, this pronouncement seems to state that the
foreseeable intervening negligent act is within the scope
of the risk created by the original negligent actor. Being
within the scope of the risk, it follows that it should be
within the scope of the liability created by that risk.
In gauging the foreseeability of a subsequent act, mat-
ters of common knowledge21 are imputed, to the actors.
Futhermore, the occasional negligence which is one of the
ordinary incidents of human life often must be antici-
That one boy would push another in the direction of a pail of scalding
water and that the one pushed would lose his balance and fall into the
pail was a foreseeable danger that a grandmother should have anticipated.
CwIk v. Zystra, 58 N.J. Super. 29, 155 A. 2d 277, 281 (1959).
It was foreseeable and reasonably ,to be anticipated that the sale of
beverages in a bottle in an athletic stadium would result in a spectator
being hit by 'a thrown bottle. Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162 Kan. 371,
176 P. 2d 590 (1947).
That a rope left dangling from defendant's bridge construction job would
be jerked and possibly cause fright to horses and resultant injury to their
drivers or pedestrians in the street below the construction job was to
be anticipated, even if the rope was jerked by one other than an employee
of the construction firm. Penn. Steel Co. v. Wilkinson, 107 Md. 574, 581,
582, 69 A. 412 (1908).
1Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149, 200 A. 353 (1938); State v. Hecht
Company, 165 Md-. 415, 169 A. 311 (1933). See Bessette v. Humiston, 121
Vt 325, 157 A. 2d 468, 470 (1960), which stated:
"Negligence may lie in the creation of a dangerous situation, al-
though the final injury Is activated by the conduct of a third person
.... Where there is likelihood of harm from an intentional or reck-
less act of an outsider, the actor who creates the situation of danger
may be held responsible for the act of the immediate wrongdoer."
0State v. Hecht, supra, n. 19, 422, quoted verbatim (except for punctua-
tion) in Holler v. Lowery, supra, n. 19, 162.
" Lashley v. Dawson, 162 Md. 549, 560, 160 A. 738 (1932).
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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pated.22 Going a step further, the user of the highway
who violates the law may not assume that others will
use an abnormal amount of care to discover his wrongful
act,23 nor may he expect that all other users will refrain
from violating the traffic regulations. Rather, ". . . it [is]
incumbent upon [one who violates the traffic laws] to
anticipate that others, like [himself], might disobey the
traffic laws and regulations." 24
Running through many" of the intervening negligence
cases and serving as a determinative rule to gauge the
superseding character of the intervening act, is the "but
for" concept. According to this rule, the original actor's
conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have
occurred without it.26 Although this rule is recognized
as explaining the great number of cases,27 its validity is
questioned by Prosser" and rejected -by the Restatement
in favor of the "substantial factor" test.29 The Restate-
ment"° declares that, where the initial actor's conduct was
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, a negli-
gent intervening act is not a superseding cause that will
discharge the initial actor of liability, if (1) there was
a "realizable likelihood" 1 of the occurrence of the inter-
vening act at the time when the initial actor committed
his negligent act, and (2) if the intervening act was not
of an extraordinary nature.
A third formula, applying to intervening negligence
cases, would hold liable the original negligent actor if the
intervening act was a natural and probable consequence of
the original negligence. Restated, if the intervening act
was foreseeable or within the scope of the risk, the original
negligent actor will not be relieved of liability.2
The ingredients, it will be noted, are similar in the
"substantial factor" test and the "natural and probable
consequences" formula. Whether the determining factor
02 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 302, Comment 1; Paosea, TORTS (2d
ed. 1955) § 32 c.
n Washington v. Kemp, 97 Ga. App. 235, 102 S.E. 2d 910, 913 (1958).
"Id.
1Washington v. Kemp, 97 Ga. App. 235, 102 S.A. 2d 910, 913 (1958);
Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P. 2d 1053, 1062 (1958); Marchi v.
Dowling, 157 Pa. Super. 91, 41 A. 2d, 427, 428 (1945); Dooley v. ,Borough
of Charleroi, 328 Pa. 57, 195 A. 6, 8 (1937); Hughes v. Pititsburgh
Transp. Co., 300 Pa. 55, 150 A. 153, 155 (1930).
"PRossEa, ToRTs (2d ed. 1955) § 44, 220.
Id., 220-221.
2Op. cit. supra, n. 26.
92 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934), §§ 433, 447.
"Id., § 447.
Op. cit. supra, n. 29, § 447, Comment on Clause (a) : a.
"PRossEa, op. cit. supra, n. 26, 255.
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of the respective tests is "realizable likelihood" of the
occurrence of the intervening act or the foreseeability of
said act, the judicial emphasis will -be focused on
analogous segments of the factual situations to which the
tests are applied.
An ambitious attempt to avoid the "but for" test and
to provide the jury with more definite guidelines than
"substantial factor" or the foreseeability of certain ac-
tions was made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Kline v. Moyer.3 The Court held that the original negli-
gent actor is only relieved of liability if the second actor
is aware of the dangerous situation created by the negli-
gence of the first actor at a time when the accident is
avoidable, and the second actor is thereafter negligent.34
In a footnote appended to the statement of the rule
the Court noted the Restatement distinction "between a
'normal response' and an 'extraordinarily negligent' act on
the part of the second tort-feasor."35 The Court concluded
that a negligent act, after one had recognized a dangerous
avoidable situation, would be an extraordinary, and not
a normal, response, which could not be reasonably foreseen
by the first actor."
While the Court felt compelled to show how its rule
meshed with that of the Restatement, it is necessary to
note the difference in emphasis between Kline v. Moyer
on the one hand, and the concept of a foreseeable inter-
vening act, on the other. Whereas Kline v. Moyer stresses
the awareness of the second actor, the inevitability of
the result at the moment of awareness, and the second
actor's reaction to his awareness of the original actor's
82325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 48, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937). The original negligence in
this case involved a disabled, unlighted truck left on a two-lane highway.
This position forced a car negligently proceeding at dusk in the lane in
which the truck rested to move across the dividing line into the path of
the plaintiff, causing the injuries for which the plaintiff sought and won
recovery from both the driver of the car and the owner of the truck.
MId., 46.
"Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a
potential danger created by the negligence of an original tortfeasor,
and thereafter, by an independent act of negligence, brings about
accident, the first tortfeasor Is relieved of liability, because the
condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident
and nvot its proximate cause. Where, however, the second actor does
not become \apprised of such danger until his own negligence, added
to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the accident
inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tortfeasors are contributing
causes and proximate factors in the happening of the accident and
impose liability upon both the guilty parties."
8 r Id.
01 Supra, n. 33.
1961]
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negligence, the concept of a foreseeable intervening act
stresses the first actor's duty to anticipate the intervening
misconduct and guard against it.
The virtue of the Kline v. Moyer principle is that it
may place before the jury a more tangible, less subjective
yardstick than foreseeability or "substantial factor." Of
course, its applicability is necessarily limited to cases in
which "awareness" can be judged, either by reference to
the individual's reaction to the stimulus of the first actor's
negligence, or by considering the standard of awareness
accorded the reasonable man. As a rule supplemental to
the concept of foreseeability and applied in cases where
awareness can be judged, the Kline v. Moyer principle
seems to have genuine value.
Kline v. Moyer has never been cited in Maryland al-
though it has won judicial endorsement beyond its own
jurisdiction8 while remaining a bulwark there. 9 Maryland
adopts the foreseeability standard." In the principal case,
in order to declare the events foreseeable,41 the Court
was forced to distinguish Maggitti v. Cloverland Farms
Dairy2 and Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Co.,45 both
of which rejected claims that double parked vehicles had
contributed to the accidents therein.
The Court, however, declared that the principal case
presented more than a passive negligence situation, and
that the connection between the acts and, omissions of the
wIn the principal case the driver of the tractor-trailer, according to
his testimony, did not become aware of the perilous situation, i.e. that
the carry-all was a school bus and that the Cadillac was stopping in
deference to the laws protecting such vehicles, until his trailer had begun
to slide, and when he could not prevent the accident. 221 Md. 507, 511, 157
A. 2d 422 (1960). Had the Kline v. Moyer principle been applied to
these facts, both the carry-all and the tractor-trailer would have been
held liable.
IsMedved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N.W. 2d 788, 793-4 (1945);
Lee v. Carolina Upholstery Co., 227 N.C. 88, 40 S.D. 2d 688, 689-690
(1946) ; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Head.
Tenn ..... , 332 S.W. 2d 682, 691 (1959) ; Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn.
App. 55, 270 S.W. 2d 572, 576 (1954); McMurdle v. Underwood, 9 Utah
2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711, 717 (1959) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Withers,
192 Va. 493, 65 S.E. 2d 654, 659 (1951) ; Johnson v. Cone, 112 Vt. 459, 28
A. 21 384, 388 (1942).
1 Humphrey v. Lovejoy, 250 F. 2d 879, 880 (3rd CIr. 1957); Steele v.
Peoples Natural Gas Company, 386 Pa. 439, 127 A. 2d 96, 100 (1956);
Listino v. Union Paving Company, 386 Pa. 32, 124 A. 2d 83, 85-86 (1956);
Jeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360, 100 A. 2d 480, 482 (1953) ; Martz v.
Deitrick, 371 Pa. 639, 92 A. 2d 678, 680-1 (1952); Tolomeo v. Harmony
Short Line Motor Transp. Co., 349 Pa. 420, 37 A. 2d 511, 514 (1944);
Ashworth v. Hannum, 347 Pa. 393, 32 A. 2d 407, 409 (1943).
Supra, circa ns. 19, 20.
41221 Md. 57, 513, 157 A. 2d 422 (1960).
- 201 Md. 528, 95 A. 2d 81 (1953).
41 179 Md. 384,18 A.2d 592 (1941).
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"School Bus" and the injury was ". .. far more likely to
have occurred as a result of what [the bus owner] did or
did not do, and so to have been anticipated, than in those
cases.
44
This statement is very persuasive in regard to the
Maggitti case, where a six year old child was denied
recovery against the dairy after he was struck down by a
speeding truck when he attempted to cross the street in
front of a double parked milk truck. That case apparently
turned on the fact that there was no allegation that the
dairyman attracted the child or knew of his presence. 5
But the "confusing situation" created by the "partial
imitation" of a school bus does not seem "far more likely"
a result than one would expect from the Bloom case. There,
a child, who had crossed a street to make a purchase from
a double parked vendor, was struck as he returned, across
the street by an automobile negligently passing the vendor.
The child was denied recovery because the negligence of
the ice cream vendor was not the natural logical cause of
the injury. The Court said:
"It [the injury] must be the natural and probable con-
sequence of the negligent act, unbroken by any inter-
vening agency, and where the negligence of any one
person is merely passive, and potential, while the
negligence of another is the moving and effective cause
of the injury, the latter is the proximate cause and
fixes the liability. '46
The Court buttressed its theory by pointing out that the
accident did not occur when the child approached the
"221 Md. 507, 514, 157 A. 2d 422 (1960).
'5"[H]e had . . . no reason to anticipate that a child of whose presence
he was unaware would attempt to cross the street between intersections,
and that a passing motorist operating his car at a high rate of speed and
negligently failing to have his car under control . . . would run the
child down." 201 Md. 528, 535, 95 A. 2d 81 (1953). Cf. Marchl v. Dowling,
157 Pa. Super. 91, 41 A. 2d 427 (1945), where a seven year old child was
struck by an automobile as it was passing a double parked truck. Both
the motorist and the truck company were held liable. The Pennsylvania
court said':
"... the illegal parking of [the] truck was a causal and substantial
factor in minor plaintiff's injury, and . . . the intervening act of
[the motorist] was not a superseding cause * * *. There would have
been no injury to the minor plaintiff but for the negligence of
[(the truck driver], which first put the minor plaintiff in peril and
which existed when the negligence of [the motorist] turned the peril
into actual injury." (428)
The violation of a statute in Pennsylvania is negligence per se. Jinks
v. Currie, 324 Pa. 532, 188 A. 356, 358 (1936). However, it is only some
evidence of negligence in Maryland. Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 65, 155
A. 2d 698 (1959).
'179 Md. 384, 387, 18 A. 2d 592 (1941).
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vendor or while he was near the truck,4 and that the
salesman did nothing to cause the child to leave the
truck or cross the street.4"
This may be fine theoretical reasoning but it seems
rather foreseeable that a child who makes a purchase
from such a vendor will return across the street to the
sidewalk from which he came and be subjected to the
perils of the street, one of which is negligent drivers.
Judicial disuse has limited the stature of the Bloom
doctrine.4" The principal case, by its view of its own factual
situation, rigidly restricts it to the factual situation pre-
sented therein, in spite of the Court's attempt to dis-
tinguish it from the situation presented in the principal
case.
To dispute the conclusions drawn from the varying
factual situations merely emphasizes points made above.
Mathematical predictability is not a feature of the law
of negligence. The enunciation of a general rule does not
foreclose discussion. That rule is only given meaning and
facilitates the end of justice by the intelligent application
of the principle to the facts of the case.5 In regard to
the field of law herein discussed the general rule would be
that a foreseeable intervening negligent act will not
exculpate an original negligent actor who sets the stage
for the intervening negligence. And, when a particular
decision is rendered as to the facts of a case, a critical
observer may find comfort in a statement of Mr. Justice
Holmes:
".. . when you realize that you are dealing with a
matter of degree, you must realize that reasonable




A8 Supra, n. 46, 389.
"Since pronouncement the Bloom doctrine has only been cited by the
Court on three occasions.
10Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Col. L. Rev. 605, 620-621, 622
(1908) :
"The nadir of mechanical Jurisprudence is reached when conceptions
are used, not as premises from which to reason, but as ultimate
solutions. 'So used, they cease to be conceptions and become empty
words. * * *
"[The true] task of a judge is to make a principle living, not by
deducing from It rules, to be, like the Freshman's hero, 'immortal
for a great many years,' but by achieving thoroughly the less am-
bitious but more useful labor of giving a fresh Illustration of the
intelligent application of the principle to a concrete cause, producing
a workable and a just result."
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
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